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THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DISINTEGRATING STATES: A NEW CHALLENGE
BARTRAM S. BROWN*
The disintegration of existing States raises many complex issues of
international law, issues which have gained a new prominence with re-
cent events in areas formerly known as Yugoslavia and the USSR. The
international legal doctrines normally applied to these issues are
grounded in the traditional "state-centric" view of international law, a
view which is increasingly outmoded, and which may finally and irre-
trievably have achieved obsolescence.
While it is now universally acknowledged that human rights viola-
tions raise issues of international law, and that they are a matter of inter-
national concern, international action to protect these rights is limited by
considerations of national sovereignty. Generally speaking, states are
less than enthusiastic about outside political action within their territory,
even when that action is of a humanitarian nature.1
Action by the international community to protect internationally
recognized human rights is all the more problematic when the state
within which the threatened individuals are located begins to dis-
integrate. The implicit state-centric assumption that a local regime could
provide remedies to protect these rights, is inapplicable in these situa-
tions. There is therefore a need for rapid and radical development of
norms, principles, and procedures permitting international action to pro-
tect human rights in situations where the disintegration of the state cre-
ates a vacuum of local legal authority. The recent practices of states and
of international organizations indicate an implicit recognition of this fact.
They demonstrate that political, diplomatic, and perhaps even military
forms of intervention have come to be seen as necessary and legal means
for the protection of human rights in disintegrating states.
The conceptual challenge which is presented by these events pro-
vides an impetus for changes not only in specific doctrines applicable to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
A.B. 1974, Harvard University; J.D. 1977, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1989, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland.
1. States do not usually resent economic aid, or the provision of food and medical supplies,
except to the extent that this type of aid is linked to what are perceived as political conditions.
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the disintegration of states, but also for changes in the general state-cen-
tric nature of the international legal order itself.
I. THE STATE-CENTRIC NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the prevailing positivist conception of international
law, that law derives its binding force from the consent of sovereign
states. That consent may be expressed explicitly, as it is in treaties, or
implicitly through the practices of states which give rise to rules of cus-
tomary international law.2 This is one important sense in which interna-
tional law is centered on states, or "state-centric." In addition,
international law was traditionally thought to create rights and obliga-
tions only for states. According to this view international law was a law
by and for states, in which the rights of individuals had no place.
An important step beyond state-centrism is implicit in the idea of an
international law of human rights, since the rights concerned are those of
individuals, or groups of individuals rather than those of states. The very
concept of internationally recognized human rights is in derogation of
state sovereignty, while traditional "state-centric" approaches to interna-
tional law insist upon a very broad definition of state sovereignty and a
formalistic defense of it from any external intrusion. This traditional
concept of international law is inherently inadequate to the task of pro-
tecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms which the UN sys-
tem is pledged to promote.
II. A DYNAMIC VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law must be capable of changing and adapting to the
realities of the international system, just as it has adapted to such
changes in the past. During the Middle Ages the prevailing conception
of international law was that it reflected the application of the Law of
Nature (natural law) to the conduct of states. When Europe's Holy Ro-
man Empire collapsed, a new international system developed in its place,
and it was supported by a new conception of international law. The 1648
Peace of Westphalia formalized the transition from a nominally unified
2. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, which defines the law which that
court is to apply in deciding disputes between states. This authoritative statement of the sources of
international law refers to three principal sources, i.e. "a. international conventions... establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;" and "c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
Each of these involves building law upon the recognition or acceptance of states or nations, i.e. upon
their consent. Judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists are referred to as "subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law." Id. art. 38(d).
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Empire to a system of sovereign Nation-States. 3 New theories of interna-
tional law developed by Grotius, 4 among others, adapted the prevailing
concepts of natural law to the changed conditions by divorcing it from
Catholic theology and supplementing it with notions of positive interna-
tional law. By the 19th century most states in regions formerly part of
the Empire no longer accepted the theologically based notion that they
were subject to obligations stemming from natural law. The idea of a
positive international law based on the consent of states emerged as the
only generally acceptable theory of international legal obligation.
More recently, this process of evolution and development has taken
international law in the direction of a renewed interest in positive expres-
sions of natural law concepts. It is in the field of international human
rights that it is most difficult to insist upon a purely positivistic model of
international law. The idea of universal human rights has its origins in
the concept of natural law, but the international law of human rights has
developed well beyond its philosophical origins.
The horrors of the Nazi holocaust brought home to many the need
for a positive international law of human rights. When concerned people
and governments abroad protested the treatment of Jews and other op-
pressed groups in Germany, Hitler rejected these protestations by char-
acterizing the issue as a matter within the domestic jurisdiction and
national sovereignty of the German state. Although the genocidal "final
solution" was morally abhorrent and unmistakably wrong, its illegality
under positive international law was less clear. The inadequacy of the
existing positive international law became apparent, and this provided
the impetus for changes to come.
Since the Second World War there has been a major thrust toward
the enactment of a positive international law of human rights. By articu-
lating human rights norms in treaties and other international normative
instruments, States and international organizations have done more than
simply create a few more rules of positive international law. They have
begun to transform the nature of the international system.
III. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Nations Charter represented a major advance in the
codification of the international political order, and it did much to de-
3. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1949).
4. See HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, LIBRI TRES. (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND
PEACE) (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Oceana 1964) (1646). Grotius lived from 1583 to 1645.
This work was first published in 1646.
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velop the international legal order as well. Promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all is explicitly
mentioned as one of that organization's purposes,5 and thus human
rights were for the first time definitively declared to be a matter of inter-
national concern. At the same time, the Charter is not very specific
about the human rights and freedoms to be promoted.
Another problem is that the Charter also expresses principles which
can be invoked against international action to protect human rights. It
reaffirms the "sovereign equality" of UN member states,6 and the UN's
lack of authority to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of its mem-
bers.7 The latter two provisions serve to reinforce the argument that
state sovereignty should preclude any intrusive international action for
the protection of human rights.
Some of these deficiencies were remedied when the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights8 was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
1948, and the post-Charter evolution of international human rights
norms and procedures began. The Universal Declaration proclaims itself
"as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations"9
in the field of human rights, and it is, in fact, the most frequently cited
standard of international human rights. But as a resolution of the UN
General Assembly it is formally non-binding, and this raises the question
of its effect upon the development of international human rights law.
Georges Abi-Saab has noted that the normative effect of UN Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions depends upon three factors: the degree of con-
sensus behind the resolution, the degree of concreteness of the normative
language in the resolution, and the extent to which mechanisms of imple-
mentation have been provided for.10 The Universal Declaration was
adopted by the General Assembly with no negative votes (although there
were 8 abstentions); thus, the consensus behind that resolution was very
strong. Today, more than 40 years after the adoption of the Declaration,
the international consensus on the question of human rights remains
strong, and as far as concreteness is concerned, the Universal Declara-
5. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 1, 3.
6. Id art. 2(1) ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.").
7. Id. art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ....").
8. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71-79, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Uni-
versal Declaration].
9. Id at 72.
10. See Georges Abi-Saab, Introduction, in LEs RESOLUTIONS DANS LA FORMATION DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DU DtVELOPMENT 9, 9-10 (1971).
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tion represents a vast improvement over the general human rights lan-
guage found in the UN Charter.
Like the UN Charter before it, the Universal Declaration contains
no specific authorization for UN action in the field of human rights. But
over the years, as international human rights norms have gained
strength, certain UN mechanisms for the application of these norms have
developed well beyond anything explicitly authorized by the Charter.
Only in Article 68 does the Charter mention an organ or mechanism for
the promotion or protection of human rights. While that article provides
for the creation of a UN Commission for the promotion of human rights,
operating under the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), it does not invest that commission with any specific
powers. 11
It is in the context of the deficiencies of the Charter that we must
evaluate the so called "1503 procedure" of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, which represents only a minimal intrusion upon
state sovereignty. It does not involve any coercive method of enforce-
ment, but instead it relies upon the use of publicity to "shame" states into
improving their human rights records.
In 1947 ECOSOC decided that it had "no power" to take any action
in regard to any complaints regarding human rights. 12 Thus it could not
take any action on any of the many complaints it began receiving as soon
as the UN was created. In 1959 it confirmed this lack of power in an-
other resolution, 13 and at the same time consolidated UN procedures for
cataloging these communications and reporting on them. As UN
Human Rights procedures have developed since that time, they have
stressed a confidential approach to the consideration of complaints about
human rights.
ECOSOC Resolution 150314 establishes a confidential procedure by
which the UN Human Rights Commission and its subsidiary organs can
consider communications, together with replies of Governments, if any,
which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This resolution
does not grant the Human Rights Commission any authority to take di-
11. "The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in the economic and social
fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the
performance of its functions." U.N. CHARTER art. 68. No specific authority is granted to any of
these commissions under the Charter.
12. E.S.C. Res. 75, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., at 20, U.N. Doc. E/573 (1947).
13. E.S.C. Res. 728F, U.N. ESCOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959).




rect action for the enforcement of human rights. What the Commission
can do, after carefully examining a reported situation, is to make recom-
mendations to ECOSOC about the need for further investigation. Under
the 1503 procedure all actions taken by the UN remain confidential until
such time as the Commission may decide to make recommendations to
ECOSOC. 15
The 1503 procedure is very limited. It is slow, and it applies only to
situations where there have been large scale or systematic denials of fun-
damental human rights. The confidential, non-public nature of the pro-
cedure is often criticized as well. But the confidential nature of the
procedure allows for the judicious use of the "shaming" power. States
under review for human rights violations generally prefer to avoid public
disclosure of this fact. This provides an incentive for them to cooperate
with the Commission in the hope of avoiding the adverse publicity which
results from a failure to resolve matters with the Commission behind the
scenes.
The 1503 procedure is supplemented by a public procedure under
Resolution 1235.16 This procedure serves as an important basis for de-
bate and public discussion during the annual meetings of the Commis-
sion and Sub-Commission on Human Rights. This procedure sometimes
leads to resolutions being adopted by the Commission or Sub-Commis-
sion, expressing concern about human rights violations in particular
countries. Special rapporteurs, special representatives, experts, and other
envoys are also sometimes sent to countries pursuant to the 1235
procedure.
UN procedures for addressing systematic violations of human rights
involve only a minimal intrusion upon the sovereignty of its Member
States.17 In fact, these procedures rely upon the existence of a national
authority politically responsible for the local human rights situation.
How then can the UN act to protect human rights in cases where state
authority is in a state of disintegration?
IV. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF DISINTEGRATING STATES
Can international law, still bridled by state-centric limitations, be
effective at protecting human rights in disintegrating states? A number
15. Id. art. 8.
16. E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. ESCOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
17. This discussion of action under Resolutions 1503 and 1235 refers only to UN procedures of
general applicability. There are a number of other UN procedures which are applicable to states
which have consented to be bound by UN negotiated human rights treaties such as the Convention
Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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of special human rights problems are raised by this situation. The disin-
tegration of state authority is often accompanied by a situation in which
the pre-existing government is at war with opposition groups or seces-
sionist groups. In such difficult times the government may take extreme
measures, inconsistent with human rights, in an effort to regain control
of the situation.
A number of human rights treaties have attempted to deal with this
problem head on. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, I" for example, allows parties to take measures derogating from of
all but seven of the most fundamental rights set out in that treaty, but
only "[i]n time of public emergency," and "to the extent required by the
exigencies of the situation." 19
In order to limit invocation of this right of derogation, the Covenant
requires that the derogating party give notice to the other parties through
the UN Secretary General. 20 The Covenant does not permit any meas-
ures derogating from certain fundamental rules, i.e., the rights to life,
and to recognition as a person before the law; freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion; and the prohibitions of torture, cruel and unusual
punishment, slavery, the slave trade, debtors prison, and ex post facto
laws.21 Similar provisions can be found in other human rights treaties
such as Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms22 and the American Convention of Human
Rights,23 although the list of "non-derogable" human rights varies
slightly among them.
These treaties indicate a growing consensus that even in a time of
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
19. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take meas-
ures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id. art. 4(1).
20. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall
immediately inform the other States parties to the present Covenant, through the interme-
diary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has
derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be
made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
Id. art. 4(3).
21. Id. art. 4(2) ("No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18
may be made under this provision.").
22. See The [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 232 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
23. See The American Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S. Treaty Series 1,
9 I.L.M. 99, 101.
1992]
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emergency, such as when the state itself begins to disintegrate, the state
remains responsible under international law, for the respect of basic
"non-derogable" human rights. While the treaties bind only the parties,
they are also evidence of state practice and as such can contribute to the
development of customary international law. It is beyond dispute that a
customary international law of human rights does now exist, and thus
even states which are not parties to any of the treaties mentioned in the
preceding paragraph have human rights obligations under customary in-
ternational law. That law includes the obligation to respect the most
fundamental human rights even in time of public emergency, and when
the government of any state violates these rights it has violated interna-
tional law. While this does not always prevent desperate governments
from violating basic human rights, the principle of responsibility does at
least provide for a certain level of deterrence. In practice these interna-
tional human rights norms are "enforced" only by the sanction of ad-
verse international publicity or "shaming." Unfortunately, some of the
other forces responsible for human rights violations are not as susceptible
to the pressure of "shaming."
Not all human rights violations are the direct responsibility of States
and their governments. The disintegration of the state can bring about a
lawless situation in which other, non-government affiliated groups com-
mit human rights violations with relative impunity. Holding the state
responsible in such situations is certainly not an adequate way to ensure
respect for human rights.
When it functions, the domestic legal order of the sovereign state
should serve as the primary means of protecting human rights. Thus the
negation of the domestic legal order can contribute to the negation of
human rights protections. The situation in Lebanon over the past several
years demonstrates how difficult it can be to protect human rights when
there is no effective authority within a state.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
"[niD one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest" (Article 9), and that every-
one has the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence (Article 12); the
Lebanese government could not guarantee either of these rights to the
Western hostages held in that country. 24 It is doubtful whether human
24. Most victims of human rights violations in Lebanon have been Lebanese nationals whose
basic rights such as the right "to life, liberty and the security of person," Universal Declaration,
supra note 8, at 72, have been jeopardized by the chaos in that country. The suffering of the western
hostages is mentioned here only because their experiences may be better known to the outside world.
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rights can ever be guaranteed without an effective governmental author-
ity which maintains a certain degree of law and order.
One problem is that when central government authority breaks
down, there is often no single authority which can be held accountable
for human rights violations, and no single authority which can act to
protect human rights. Another is that the public "shaming" often used
to induce improved human rights performance works most effectively
with established governments, and is less effective against ill identified
groups contending for power.
The four Geneva Conventions, in their "Common Article 3," create
special principles of "humanitarian law" 25 to help to fill this gap in inter-
national human rights law. Common Article 3 sets out general rules of
law applicable to "armed conflicts not of an international character"
such as internal armed insurgencies. These rules, which are applicable to
all parties to any of the Geneva Conventions, prohibit certain specified
acts of inhumane treatment against persons taking no active part in the
hostilities. 26 While the applicability of these rules to acts by insurgents,
rebels, or other non-state entities is complicated by the fact that these
entities are not formal parties to the Geneva Conventions, it seems clear
that these rules are now customary international law and thus are appli-
cable not only to states, but to actors at all levels of the international
system.27 This is but one example of how humanitarian imperatives have
pushed international law beyond state-centrism.
V. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SHIFT AWAY FROM
STATE-CENTRIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A number of scholars have suggested that international law must
progress from its state-centric roots into a more evolved system which
25. "Humanitarian law is that considerable portion of international law which is inspired by a
feeling for humanity and is centred on the protection of the individual in time of war." JEAN
PIcTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (1985).
26. See the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Article 3 of this convention is
identical to the Article 3 of the other Geneva Conventions of 1949, thus the designation "Common
Article 3." That article prohibits all of the following acts against noncombatants:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treat-
ment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
27. Pictet observes that "Article 3 constitutes an essential step toward universality for the law
of Geneva." PICTET, supra note 25, at 47.
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protects the rights and interests not only of states but of peoples and
individuals as well. W. Michael Reisman 28 argues that international
human rights norms are "constitutive norms," in that they imply a radi-
cal and qualitative change in international law as a whole. Thus he sees
the need for a process which might be referred to as the "updating,"
"contemporization," or "actualization" of international norms in light of
human rights norms. He asserts that "[p]recisely because the human
rights norms are constitutive, other norms must be reinterpreted in their
light."
Reisman focuses upon the need for a contemporized concept of
"sovereignty," which recognizes that a government may violate the sov-
ereignty of its own people, and that outside intervention may, in some
cases, be consistent with sovereignty. 29 He points out that today popular
sovereignty is "firmly rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of
political legitimacy,"' 30 and notes that "[i]nternational law is still con-
cerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern sense, the
object of the protection is not the power base of the tyrant ... but the
continuing capacity of a population freely to express and effect choices
about the identities and policies of its governors.
'31
Reisman is correct in asserting that state sovereignty must be rede-
fined in light of human rights norms before those norms can be put into
effect. It is now commonly accepted that governments exercising sover-
eign prerogatives do so subject to an obligation to respect human rights.
Philip Allott has also stressed deficiencies in the state-centric ap-
proach to international law.32 He observes that the concept of "state
necessity," sometimes invoked by states to justify unlawful behavior, is
"the most persistent and formidable enemy of a truly human society."
'33
Allott criticizes the work of the International Law Commission in the
field of state responsibility by noting that it "affirms rather than con-
strains power," and also "reveals the long-term destructive effect of a
government dominated commission on the development of international
law."' 34 He laments that international law "is trapped in the prerevolu-
tionary world of the eighteenth century" and that "[t]he international
28. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 873 (1990).
29. Id at 872, 876.
30. Id. at 867.
31. Id. at 872.
32. Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1988).
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id at 2.
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law of the old regime is preventing the emergence of the new interna-
tional society."' 35
Allott follows his criticisms of the old international law with pro-
posals for the manifesto of a new international law in a new international
society. Many of his proposals relate directly to the need to move be-
yond the state-centric concept of international law. Two in particular are
worth mentioning here. He proposes:
(1) to acknowledge the peoples of the world as the true subjects of
international law, even if the societies known as states continue to be,
for the time being, the formal subjects of international law;
(2) to accept state practice as the legislative source of the customary
form of international law, but state practice in the Grotian spirit, that
is, the universal experience of mankind in society. ... 36
Allott's points here could be reformulated as follows: (1) the real
purpose of international law is to promote the well-being of "peoples"
and not states; and (2) it therefore makes little sense to allow the neces-
sary development of customary international law to be blocked by the
inevitable reluctance of many state actors to relinquish the exalted status
which they presently enjoy, a status which prevents them from being sub-
jected to the rule of law in any meaningful sense. In essence, then, he is
calling for progress beyond the state-centric model of international law.
Over the years many non-lawyers have also proposed moving be-
yond the state-centric international system. One of the best known and
most influential of them was David Mitrany. Mitrany formulated and
disseminated a theory of international organization known as "function-
alism."137 This theory holds that a world community can best be
achieved, not by attempts at the immediate political union of states, but
by the creation of non-political international agencies dealing with spe-
cific economic, social, technical, or humanitarian functions. Functional-
ism assumes that economic, social, and technical problems can be
separated from political problems and insulated from political pressures.
Because of the greater difficulties involved in resolving political
problems, the theory maintains that non-political forms of international
cooperation should be given priority, and that only later, after states have
developed habits of effective international cooperation concerning such
35. "International law is trapped in the prerevolutionary world of the eighteenth century, the
world made by Vattel, the world before the American and French Revolutions, before Rousseau and
Marx. The international law of the old regime is preventing the emergence of the new international
society." Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 26.
37. See DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (4th ed. 1946), for the most classic
exposition of the theory of functionalism.
1992]
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matters, will it be possible to apply the new cooperative skills and habits
to high-level political problems. 38 Mitrany's theory of functionalism was
so widely read and discussed during the 1940's (when the UN was
founded) that it is sometimes said to form an important part of the theo-
retical basis for the creation of the UN system of specialized agencies. 39
There have always been doubts about the basic assumptions behind the
theory. 40 In spite of these problems, the theory of functionalism is an
important theoretical antecedent to the present discussion.
Among other things, Mitrany's theory suggested that eventually the
"loyalty" of individuals would shift from the state to international insti-
tutions as they became increasingly effective at providing for the needs of
people around the world. Recent events suggest that it is not so much
the loyalties of individuals as the bases of "legitimacy" which are shifting
upwards from the state to international institutions and international
human rights norms. Whereas the state-centric model tells us that inter-
national law is established and made legitimate by the consent of states, it
is now increasingly true that international law, especially international
human rights law, provides the standard by which the legitimacy of
states is established.
These developments are all part of a fundamental shift away from
the old state-centric international law. Ironically, the evidence of this
shift can be found in the practice of states themselves. This shift in the
center of the international legal and political universe is so fundamental
that it may be said to constitute a "Copernican revolution"-a paradigm
shift in which existing conceptions have to be rethought because of a new
view or understanding of what constitutes the "center. ' 41
38. Inis L. Claude Jr. calls this the "separability-priority" thesis. INIS L. CLAUDE JR., SWORDS
INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 384 (4th
ed. 1971).
39. Eckart Klein has gone so far as to say that "[t]he conceptual basis of the Specialized Agen-
cies is functionalism." Eckart Klein, United Nations Specialized Agencie in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 366 (1983).
40. See CLAUDE, supra note 38, 38-391. The assumption that economic, social, and technical
matters can be effectively separated from politics is particularly dubious. With regard to this as-
sumption Inis L. Claude Jr. has asked rhetorically, "Does not this assumption fly in the face of the
evidence that a trend toward politicization of all issues is operative in the twentieth century?" Id. at
388.
41. In 1512 the Polish astronomer Copernicus radically transformed the European view of the
cosmos by affirming that the Earth and the other planets revolve around the sun. Before Coperni-
cus, the Western World believed the Earth to be the center of the universe. For more on the notion
of a paradigm shift, see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
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VI. EVIDENCE OF A COPERNICAN REVOLUTION IN RECENT STATE
PRACTICE
As mentioned earlier, it is now commonly accepted that govern-
ments exercising sovereign prerogatives do so subject to an obligation to
respect human rights. Thus state sovereignty has already been redefined
to a certain extent to accommodate the new "constitutive" human rights
norms. The extent to which this has happened can be confirmed from
the practice of states and international organizations, which by their ac-
tions have established the right of the international community to act
when human rights violations shock the conscience of the world and
threaten international peace and security.
Since 1945 Chapter VII of the UN Charter has, in theory, provided
a means for coordinated international action to cope with any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. In practice, however,
this flexible legal and institutional framework was rarely functional. In
the past, the Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR precluded
effective action by the Security Council, and this paralysis was thought to
reflect the fundamental political realities of the era. However, with the
advent of a post Cold War world, this excuse for international inaction
and ineffectiveness is no longer available. It is now time for the interna-
tional community to demonstrate that it can indeed act as a community.
The international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrated
that a coordinated response to international aggression can now be
achieved. The crises resulting from the disintegration of states such as
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union provide a first test of whether
the international community can act effectively when the threat to peace
and security results from tensions and conflict internal to an existing
state.
A. Non- Violent Political and Diplomatic Intercession
By their actions states have clearly recognized a right of interna-
tional humanitarian political intercession, as distinguished from military
intervention, in cases where human rights violations are credibly alleged
to have occurred. UN diplomatic intercession is now common with re-
gard to human rights matters which were formerly considered to be "es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the state under Article 2(7)
of the UN Charter. Like many other international standards, Article
2(7) has implicitly been reinterpreted (and restricted) as the constitutive
norms of international human rights law have developed. This has been
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especially apparent in cases where there has been a disintegration of
state authority.
The breakdown of the state undermines the argument that state sov-
ereignty is being violated by multilateral action. It seems quite logical
that sovereignty, when absent defacto, need not be so rigidly and formal-
istically deferred to, especially not by legitimate international institutions
taking humanitarian action.
1. The Example of OAS Intercession in Haiti
The people of Haiti have long endured both dictatorial rulers and
renegade military and paramilitary death squads. But since the Charter
of the Organization of American States (OAS) reflects an even stronger
standard of non-intervention than that in the UN Charter, there was lit-
tle that organization could do about the situation. Recently the Organi-
zation of American States has taken a prominent role in arranging
negotiations between ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
and the present military government in Haiti. Aristide is the first demo-
cratically elected President in the history of Haiti, and the OAS has so
far insisted upon his return to power as the best means of restoring de-
mocracy to that country. The hope of ending an OAS economic em-
bargo against Haiti provided the military government with a strong
incentive for cooperation with the regional organization.
42
By this combination of actions the OAS has interceded in the inter-
nal politics of Haiti, and not allAmerican states are entirely comfortable
with this. In this case, though, the forces generated by the global trend
towards democracy may be too compelling to be denied. Both Haitian
military leaders and President Aristide have agreed to an OAS brokered
arrangement, although there is still some doubt as to whether President
Aristide will ever regain full constitutional authority in that country. At
one point, military intervention was reportedly being considered as one
way of ending the mass violations of human rights in that country, and of
insuring President Aristide's return to power.43 Although this is not
likely to happen, the present level of OAS involvement in the situation is
quite remarkable, and it provides a clear example of the trend towards
stronger multilateral political intercession/intervention for the promo-
tion of human rights.
42. See Thomas L. Friedman, Regional Group Agrees to Increase Penalties on Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A3.
43. See Barbara Crosette, Plan for Global Peacekeepers to Soothe Haiti is Weighed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1992, at A12.
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2. New Standards of Diplomatic Recognition
The right to self determination of peoples has always been rather
vaguely defined. In practice, the exercise of this right has often been
subordinated to the state sovereignty of established states and concern
about maintaining their territorial integrity. The right to self-determina-
tion has both external and internal dimensions, but the internal dimen-
sion has not been given much consideration by the international
community due to what now appear to be overbroad concerns about
sovereignty."
The most significant manifestation of this right was the process of
decolonization which occurred after the Second World War.
Decolonization was concerned primarily with the external dimension of
self-determination. A consensus was reached to the effect that the right
to self-determination required the end of external colonial domination.
There is considerably less consensus concerning the applicability of that
right within a state.
Recent debates concerning when it might be appropriate to recog-
nize breakaway states concern the relative importance of 1) the state-
centric right of territorial integrity, and 2) a subject people's right to self-
determination. By deciding to recognize many of these states45 even
before they were de facto independent, the recognizing states have in ef-
fect distanced themselves from the predominant state-centric view of in-
ternational law.
In an early stage of the disintegration of the former USSR, the lack
of effective control of territory, border posts, etc. by the Baltic states was
invoked by President George Bush as a situation precluding their legal
recognition by the United States.46 This position was entirely consistent
with the traditional approach to recognition. However, had all states
held to this view, the international community would have been left with
no effective means for promoting and protecting the national rights of
these peoples. As it happened, the timid approach was jettisoned when it
44. B.G. Ramcharan, Strategies for the International Protection of Human Rights in the 1990's,
13 HUM. RTs. Q. 155, 164 (1991).
45. Among the new states which were recognized by a substantial portion of the international
community before they had gained de facto control over their territory were Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina; as well as the Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
46. At a news conference with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney on August 26, 1991, Presi-
dent Bush mentioned a number of political factors influencing his decision on whether to recognize
the Baltic republics, and then noted: "... But also, I want to know a little more about controlling
one's own territory and what you're recognizing. I mean, there are some difficulties there. Lithua-
nia, today, for example, is different than the Lithuania that had its freedom and that was recognized
by us." See Change in Soviet Union President Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH, Sept. 2, 1991, at 8.
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became apparent that it did not allow for an adequate response to the
situation which had developed in late 1991. The European Community
States were among the first to recognize Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
as independent states4 7 and the United States followed suit a few days
later.4
8
Some countries, such as those of the European Community, have
tied their decisions on recognition of breakaway states to specific condi-
tions concerning respect for the human rights of individuals and minori-
ties within the newly constituted states.49 This is yet another example of
the increased willingness of states to use non-violent political intercession
to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights.
B. UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights
In January of 1991, the United Nations Security Council held its
first ever Security Council summit, a meeting of the Council at which the
members were represented by their heads of state. The final declaration
approved by the 15 world leaders at that summit acknowledges the ex-
tent to which the role of UN peacekeeping has changed since the end of
the Cold War.
The members of the Council note that United Nations peace-
keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent
years. Election monitoring, human-rights verification and the repatria-
tion of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the
request or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral
parts of the Security Council's effort to maintain international peace
and security. They welcome these developments.
The members of the Council also recognize that change, however
welcome, has brought new risks for stability and security. Some of the
most acute problems result from changes to state structure& The mem-
bers of the Council will encourage all efforts to help achieve peace,
stability and cooperation during these changes....
The international community therefore faces new challenges in
the search for peace. All member states expect the United Nations to
play a central role at this crucial stage. The members of the Council
stress the importance of strengthening and improving the United Na-
tions to increase its effectiveness. They are determined to assume fully
47. Andrew Rosenthal, A Mosaic of Motive" The West's Response to Baltic Quest for Indepen-
dence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at All.
48. Andrew Rosenthal, Soviet Turmoil: Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Republic Leaders Move to Take
Power from Soviet Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at Al.
49. According to Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands, the EC states in-
sisted upon two principles regarding recognition, i.e. "that there be no unilateral change of borders
between the republics, especially by force, and that each republic respect the rights of minorities."
Steven Greenhouse, Soviet Turmoil; Gorbachev Threatens to Quit Unless Republics Find a Way to
Preserve a Modified Union; A Gain for Baltics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at Al, All.
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their responsibilities within the United Nations Organization in the
framework of the Charter.
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not
in itself insure international peace and security. The non-military
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecologi-
cal fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Na-
tions membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies,
needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters. 50
1. UN Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia's "Internal" Dispute
The UN presence in Yugoslavia provides an excellent example of
the new broader role for UN peacekeeping described above, especially as
it applies to the "acute problems [which] result from changes to state
structures." Traditionally, UN peacekeeping has been used only when
international peace and security was threatened by tensions between two
or more states. In Yugoslavia, however, the conflict has so far been en-
tirely confined to the territory of what until recently was a single UN
member state. Nonetheless, on September 25, 1991 the Security Council
passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo upon Yugoslavia, 51 and
then in February of 1992 it passed a resolution authorizing the creation
of a peacekeeping force in that country known as the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).52 At that time Yugoslavia was still,
officially, a single state, and the purpose of UNPROFOR was to prevent
conflict among groups within Yugoslavia, and thereby to help create the
conditions of peace and security required for negotiation of an overall
political settlement among the contending parties there.
That action was considerably more than simple political interces-
sion, but was still less intrusive than coercive military intervention. Like
all UN peacekeeping operations, UNPROFOR was deployed with the
consent of the territorial sovereign; in this case with the consent of both
the Yugoslav government and the other principal factions there. UN-
PROFOR remains in place with the consent of those states on whose
territory it continues to operate, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia.
As UNPROFOR was being created the idea of authorizing it as a
potentially coercive force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter53 was
50. Text of Final Declaration for U.N. Summit, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1992, § 1, at 4 (emphasis
added).
51. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
52. See S.C. Res. 743, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
53. If the UNPROFOR force had been authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter it would
have the authority to operate in Yugoslavia even if the Yugoslavian government (and/or other par-
ties to that conflict) were to withdraw their. consent to the presence of UN forces on their territory.
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considered, but ultimately rejected. Nonetheless coercive UN military
action in Yugoslavia has been approved in the form of a UN enforced
"no fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 54 The enforcement of such a
zone under UN auspices could take the level of UN involvement in Yu-
goslavia well beyond anything authorized there so far.
55
Ironically, and as a direct result of what was once perceived as an
"internal" Yugoslavian conflict, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are
now independent states and members of the UN, while for the moment,
the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is no longer recognized as
a member of the UN. 56 The UN's political and diplomatic intercession
in Yugoslavia has thus progressed through phases including sanctions,
the deployment of peacekeeping forces, the admission of breakaway for-
mer Yugoslav republics as independent UN members, and now the ex-
pulsion of the remaining Yugoslav state from membership in the UN.
2. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia
Like Yugoslavia, the situation in Cambodia has been one of war and
disintegration. But unlike Yugoslavia, the conflict has been ongoing for
almost two decades, and the factions are politically and not ethnically
divided. Although outside intervention has done much to complicate the
Cambodian situation, for years the conflict has been primarily one be-
tween local factions, some of them quite literally genocidal. 57 Only in
recent years, however, has the UN been able to intercede diplomatically
in an effort to bring peace to that country. With the adoption of Security
Council resolution 945 on February 28, 1992, authorizing the creation of
UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), the UN
The decisions of the Security Council taken under Chapter VII are binding upon the members of the
UN. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25, 39-51.
54. See S.C. Res. 781, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992) (establishing a ban on military flights in
the air space above Bosnia and Herzegovina). This ban does not apply to UNPROFOR ffights or to
humanitarian assistance, and it is to be monitored by UNPROFOR.
55. The Security Council had already authorized some Chapter VII authorized actions in the
Yugoslav theatre. A resolution passed in August of 1992 specifically invokes Chapter VII of the
Charter as it calls upon States "to take .. all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with
the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others
of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina." S.C. Res. 770, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992).
56. The Security Council recommended to the General Assembly that Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) be required to apply for membership in the UN, considering "that the state formerly
known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist." S.C. Res. 777, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/777 (1992). On September 22, 1992 the General Assembly passed a resolution which
in effect expelled the truncated Yugoslav state from the UN by requiring it to submit a new applica-
tion for membership. U.N. doc. A/RES/47/l (1992).
57. See Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, II
HUM. RTs. Q. 82 (1989).
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has moved beyond mere intercession, and even beyond traditional
peacekeeping, into a transitional role in the administration of Cambodia.
Up to 15,000 troops will be sent to demobilize the four armed local fac-
tions in Cambodia, and an advance team of 1,273 civilian and military
personnel was already in place by February of 1992. The plan is for
UNTAC to take over the civil administration of the country, oversee the
human rights situation, reorganize a national defense force, and then
help to bring about a democratic electoral process and certify free elec-
tions before leaving. This is the most ambitious peacekeeping project
which has ever been undertaken by the United Nations. Technically
UNTAC, like UNPROFOR, operates upon the consent of the territorial
sovereign, and is not a coercive force under Chapter VII of the Charter.
C. Humanitarian Intervention Through Military Action
When the breakdown of a state leads to disorder and to widespread
violations of human rights, military intervention emerges as a possible
response. The debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention has
always been a difficult one, in part because it raises questions concerning
the priorities between different rules and principles of international law.
In a real sense, the issue involves a debate over the relative importance
of two types of human rights. On the one hand, there are the human
rights of the victims one might hope to protect through intervention;
while on the other hand, there is the collective human right of self-deter-
mination, which is a corollary of the principle of non-intervention. 58
When a state asserts its right to be free from foreign intervention, it is in
part asserting the collective right of its people to determine their own
political destiny.
The argument for humanitarian intervention might be characterized
as stemming from natural law; thus to the extent that natural (human)
rights are being violated by a government or anyone else, an intervention
involving the proportionate use of force to remedy this problem should
not be illegal. But the unilateral use of force under the guise of humani-
tarian intervention remains extremely controversial, especially where
there are unanswered questions concerning the popular will of the local
people, the level of atrocities which warrant intervention, and the possi-
ble ulterior motives of the intervening state.59 Reisman notes that "[t]he
most satisfactory solution to this problem is the creation of centralized
institutions, equipped with decision-making authority and the capacity to
58. R.J. VINCENT, HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115 (1986).
59. See Reisman, supra note 28, at 875.
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make it effective." 6 While new, more centralized international institu-
tions have not been forthcoming, the existing multilateral institutions
have begun to act more assertively and effectively in the past few years.
The tone of the Security Council Summit Declaration quoted above indi-
cates a revitalized new attitude toward multilateral action for human
rights. Once again, concerns about the violation of state sovereignty are
reduced where there has been a breakdown of state authority.
D. UN Action on Iraq's Repression of its Kurdish Population
The UN authorized use of multilateral force for the liberation of
Kuwait was perhaps the most spectacular, and the most coercive, expres-
sion so far of the new active United Nations. There was certainly an
important humanitarian aspect to that entire operation, but economic
and political factors played an even larger role. In a broad sense, though,
that operation demonstrated the extent to which it is now possible to
mobilize the international community to act in support of the consensus
values of the community. The consensus values at stake in Kuwait were
many of the most fundamental to state sovereignty: the sanctity of bor-
ders, territorial integrity, and the prohibition on the aggressive use of
force.
The community value of international peace and security was also at
risk, and in an effort to preserve this, the UN has continued to act force-
fully in and around Iraq. Acting pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tions 687, 699, and 707, UN inspectors have conducted a series of
intrusive missions on Iraqi territory to survey the extent of that country's
nuclear and chemical weapons capability. As might be expected, Iraq
has resisted these inspections as unacceptably infringing upon its sover-
eignty. But instead of backing off in deference to this principle, the UN
has strongly protested the obstacles which Iraq has created to its
inspections.
61
UN actions with regard to the Kurds in Northern Iraq are more
directly relevant to the issue of whether there is a trend towards multilat-
eral action for the protection of human rights. UN Security Council
Resolution 688, passed after the end of the Gulf War, injects the UN into
60. Id.
61. It is true that in the past states defeated in war have often forfeited their sovereignty, and
this may seem to be particularly appropriate when the defeated state was responsible for initiating a
war of aggression. What is new here, is that in this case it is an international organization based on
the respect of state sovereignty, the United Nations, which is imposing itself upon the territory of the
defeated state.
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the issue of the welfare of these people. 62 Operative paragraph 1 of that
resolution "condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population...
in Kurdish populated areas" and notes that the consequences of that re-
pression "threaten international peace and security in the region." The
mention of a threat to international peace and security is important, be-
cause the recognition by the Security Council of such a threat is a prereq-
uisite for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. While
no enforcement action specifically in response to the Kurdish situation
has been authorized so far, the language of resolution 688 leaves the door
open to this possibility.
Operative paragraph 6 of this resolution "[a]ppeals to all Member
States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these hu-
manitarian relief efforts." This language comes very close to a multilat-
62. Security Council Resolution 688 reads as follows:
The Security Council,
Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations,
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of
refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions, which
threaten international peace and security in the region,
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved,
Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the
United Nations dated 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442),
Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436
and S/22447),
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area,
Bearing in mind the Secretary-General's report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366),
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq,
including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten
international peace and security in the region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in
the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and polit-
ical rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organiza-
tions to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all neces-
sary facilities for their operations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to
report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight
of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from
the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal,
including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical
needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;
6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute
to these humanitarian relief efforts;
7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (emphasis in original).
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eral authorization of humanitarian intervention, and key members of the
Security Council have treated it as such. Soon after the resolution was
adopted, British Prime Minister John Major publicly expressed his hu-
manitarian concern about the treatment of Iraqi Kurds. Following his
lead, the United States and France joined the United Kingdom in estab-
lishing "safe haven" zones of refuge for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Iraq
complained that its sovereignty was being violated, but the intervention
had been "collectively legitimized" by the action of the Security Coun-
cil.63 Further UN action to protect the Kurds may be yet to come.
The explicit authorization of humanitarian intervention by the
United Nations would be a very radical step indeed, but under Chapter
VII of the Charter it could be done if the Security Council decides that
international peace and security are at risk. By definition, such interven-
tion implies the limited subordination of state sovereignty in favor of
more fundamental humanitarian concerns. Until recently there has
never been a consensus within the United Nations that humanitarian
concerns were more fundamental than state sovereignty. Since Resolu-
tion 688 stops short of an unambiguous authorization of humanitarian
intervention, the consensus may not quite be there yet.
Nonetheless, resolution 688, and the acts of humanitarian interven-
tion which followed its adoption, provide evidence of a greater willing-
ness on the part of the Security Council to become involved in action to
protect human rights. This supports the view that international law may
be shifting away from an exclusive focus upon states and their interests.
This is obviously not a simple case of the disintegration of a state
leading to human rights violations. The Iraqi regime had been using
poison gas attacks and other forms of terror and repression against the
Kurds for years before the Gulf War. But it was only when the Gulf
War left the Iraqi government in a weakened and desperate state that the
UN Security Council became directly involved in attempting to protect
the human rights of Iraqi Kurds.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The concept of state sovereignty reflected in Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of
the UN Charter has been the cornerstone of the Westphalian interna-
63. Although the Security Council's appeal for assistance did not constitute an explicit and
legally valid authorization of intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter, it did have the effect of
politically legitimizing the actions taken. This process of "collective legitimization" is more often
associated with resolutions of the UN General Assembly. See I.L. Claude Jr., Collective Legitimiza-
tion as a Political Function of the United Nations, 20 INT'L ORG. 367 (1966).
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tional system.64 Opposed to this concept are principles of human rights
and the self-determination of peoples, which also find their expression in
the Charter.
The only way in which these ideas can be reconciled is by recogniz-
ing that under the Charter, state sovereignty does not include the right to
violate human rights. While this has been the situation de jure since
1945, the lack of effective mechanisms of implementation has left states
free, de facto, to violate the human rights of their own citizens with rela-
tive impunity.65 Recent developments suggest that the states comprising
the international community now attach a greater than ever importance
to human rights norms, and that in an increasing number of cases they
are willing to take action, both in cooperation with the UN and sepa-
rately, to implement human rights. The recent practice of states in the
international community indicates that traditional concerns about re-
spect for state sovereignty are no longer an absolute bar to international
action for human rights even where that action may intrude upon the
territory of states.
A. The Structural Critique of International Law
The utility of international law in promoting the shared interests of
states is not seriously subject to question. If international law did not
exist, states would have to invent it. When European states gained sover-
eignty and freedom from the domination of the Emperor and the Pope
after the Thirty Years War they needed a system of law based on respect
for the sovereignty and coexistence with other states. In response to this
need, the modern system of international law developed over the years, in
parallel with the state-centric nation-state system. What remains to be
seen is whether international law can now develop into a system which
serves the larger needs of the international community as it may come to
be defined in terms of supranational and subnational actors as well as
states.
It has sometimes been argued that international law is inherently
biased, and it is true that for centuries the law of the European Nation-
State system failed to protect the interests of those who were colonized,
64. "In traditional international law, the aspirations of individuals for justice, peace and secur-
ity are served by a system in which territorially identified nation-states are internally and externally
sovereign, but are subject to the limiting norms of international law." Gray L. Dorsey, The McDou-
gal-Lasswell Proposal to Build a World Public Order, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 41-42 (1988).
65. There are a few effective mechanisms, of course, such as the Council of Europe's human
rights system and the regime under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, but these apply only regionally, or to a small group of self-selected states.
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subjugated, and enslaved. 66 Nonetheless, that system of law has proven
to be increasingly effective at protecting the interests of those political
entities recognized as States. Now that decolonization has been for the
most part completed, and practically the entire surface of the earth is
part of the sovereign territory of one state or another, what began as
Europe's state-centric legal order serves a broader geographical range of
state actors than ever before. The membership of the United Nations
now stands at 175 states, including 14 states which were formerly part of
the Soviet Union.
67
At a certain level, and based on a broad principle of respect for state
sovereignty, a state-centric system of international law could be quite fair
to all states, assuming, of course, that one could make whatever adjust-
ments that may be necessary to ensure that the rights of all states are
respected. 68 Even as the number of participants in that system has
evolved, there has always been an international consensus of states to the
effect that international law is and should be state-centric. The question
raised by recent developments is whether international law is now grow-
ing beyond its state-centric roots.
B. The Dynamic of Change in International Law and Practice
The disintegration of states presents a new challenge to the entire
international system of states, but to some extent it is a challenge which
states themselves have helped to bring about by their policies of political
intervention in the human rights affairs of other states. Such interven-
66. See R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15-21
(1987).
67. Ukraine and Byelorussia (now known as Belarus) were founding members of the UN, and
Russia has succeeded to the membership formerly held by the USSR. The Baltic Republics of Lithu-
ania, Latvia, and Estonia joined the UN in September of 1991, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova,
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were admitted on March 2,
1992.
68. It would by no means be easy to achieve a consensus on what changes might be necessary to
perfect the fairness of a state-centric legal order. Even if one were to define the task of international
law in simple terms as "protecting the sovereignty of every state," there is considerable dispute as to
the present meaning of the term "sovereignty." Contentious issues include whether sovereignty in-
cludes a completely free liberty of contract (the principle of "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources" is relevant here), whether the effective sovereignty of former colonies and poor states
requires that they receive compensation from rich states, and whether such an obligation to compen-
sate could be consistent with the sovereignty of rich states. These contentious issues, and many
others tied to the scope of "state sovereignty" are all raised in one way or another by the resolutions
passed by the UN General Assembly in 1974 which formulate the call for a New International
Economic Order. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doec. A/9559 (1974), re-
printed in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATER. 715 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATER. 720 (1974).
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tion is legally and morally defensible, but the political consequences have
proven to be greater than anticipated.
Clearly, new international legal mechanisms and norms are needed
to deal with these new challenges. In times of disintegration, national
minorities need protection which goes beyond mere expressions of inter-
national concern, and any government which violates the fundamental
human rights of its citizens should be subject to international pressure to
change. Governments should not be able to escape such humanitarian
pressure simply by invoking an expansive notion of state sovereignty as a
shield. In practice it seems to be increasingly difficult for them to do so.
Taken together, the changes which may be coming, along with those
which have already taken place, constitute a "Copernican revolution" in
international law, defining a new center for the international legal uni-
verse. Any such revolution is likely to encounter resistance, as it threat-
ens long-held conceptions of the essential nature of the order in which we
live. While human society could not ultimately alter the fact that the
universe does not revolve around the Earth, the definition of our interna-
tional legal and political universe is subject to human control.
There is no scientific or metaphysical inevitability to the develop-
ment of a less state-centric international order, but recent developments
suggest that the actions of states, groups, international organizations, and
individuals may nonetheless be destined to bring this about. We are now
living through what may prove to be a decisive transitional phase, and
the special set of humanitarian problems presented by the disintegration
of states may provide a key impetus for this change.
69
69. The vacuum of government authority in Somalia subsequent to the ouster of General
Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, provided an unusually clear and shocking illustra-
tion of how the disintegration of state authority can undermine basic human rights. As feuding
warlords and armed bands battled each other and looted food shipments, the total collapse of central
authority made it impossible for international relief efforts to relieve the widespread famine in
Somalia.
On December 2, 1992, just as this article went to press, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 794 regarding the situation in Somalia. Operative paragraph 10 of that resolu-
tion provides that the Security Council:
"ACTING UNDER Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, AUTHORIZES
the Secretary-General and member states cooperating to implement the offer... [of mili-
tary assistance made by the United States]... to use all necessary means to establish as
soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."
This is the first time that the Security Council has authorized the use of force under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter for reasons which are purely humanitarian in nature. Article 39 of the
Charter provides that action under Chapter VII is to be taken only in response to a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Accordingly, the preamble of resolution 794 con-
tains an explicit determination that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security."
That preamble also explicitly recognizes "the unique character of the present situation in
19921 "
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Somalia and ... its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature." Although some have ex-
pressed concern about the decision to allow the United States to retain command of this mission, the
vote for Resolution 794 in the Security Council was unanimous; and thus even China, which tradi-
tionally abstains on matters involving the use of UN forces, publicly agreed that this international
action was necessary. For the moment, international community seems to have reached a point
where multilaterally authorized humanitarian intervention is a legally and politically viable option,
at least where local state authority has completely bioken down as it has in Somalia. This is just the
most recent evidence that humanitarian concerns have caused the international legal order to evolve
beyond the purely state-centric model.
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